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The Model Employment Termination Act (META):
Does It Violate the Right to Trial by Jury?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Model Employment Termination Act (META) was drafted by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in August of
1991.1 Its purpose is to serve as a statutory model for states to adopt in
order to improve the ever-changing and unstable common-law doctrine of
employment at will. 2 In short, the employment at will doctrine has
traditionally meant that employment relationships of unspecified duration
have been presumed to be at the will of either the employer or employee;
either party may. without legal consequence, terminate the relationship
without notice and for good cause, bad cause, or even cause that is morally
wrong.3
In more recent years, however, because of its sometimes harsh results
and the fact that the typical employer stands in a superior position to the
average employee, some courts and state legislatures have created
exceptions to the doctrine to aid the terminated employee. 4 These exceptions
have not necessarily been applied consistently by the courts. 5 In fact,
besides the uncertain court decisions, other defects in the present system
include its expense and time-consuming nature. 6 These consequences have
led to the whittling away of the traditional employment at will doctrine and
the creation of a much more unstable application of employment law to the
workplace.
META is an initiative to address these concerns. The Model Act
removes the right of trial by jury for those employees who now can sue for
breach of contract and tort with respect to unfair terminations and installs
the use of binding arbitration. In return, the employer must meet a "good
cause" termination standard. 7 It has been said by some of its promulgators
1 MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION Acr (1991) [hereinafter M.E.T.A.].
2 Mary A. Bedikian, Transforming At-Will Employment Disputes into Wrongful
Discharge Claims: Fertile Groundfor ADR, 1993 J. Disp. RESOL. 113, 113.
3 Payne v. Western & A.R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518 (1884).
4 Bedikian, supra note 2, at 113. Only Montana has a statute preventing the discharge of
employees without just cause. Id. The additional protections have been accomplished through
case law, workers' compensation, or whistleblowers' legislation. ld.
5 Paul H. Tobias, Defects in the Model Employment Termination Act, 43 LAB. L.J. 500,
500 n.1 (1992).
61d.
7 Leonard B. Mandelbaum, Employment at Will: Is the Model Termination Act the
Answer?, 44 LAB. L.J. 275, 275 (1993). The "good cause" standard is meant to be applied
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and supporters that the act is a compromise between employee and employer
in that the act extinguishes all common-law rights, including trial by jury,
and claims of a terminated employee against the employer in return for the
employer meeting a higher justification for employee discharge, a "good
cause" discharge. 8 The new cause of action is brought before a binding
arbitrator. This quid pro quo between employer and employee, however,
raises the constitutional issue of a possible violation of the employee's right
to trial by jury. So far, no state, with the exception of Montana, which
already had a pre-existing wrongful discharge statute, 9 has adopted the
Model Act.
This Note will raise the issue of whether the mandatory binding
arbitration and the creation of the "good cause" termination right in place of
the common-law rights of the employee in META violates the employee's
constitutional right to a trial by jury. Section II will introduce the
employment at will doctrine and the META answer to the current problems
of the wrongful discharge claim. Section III will discuss the applicable
standard for judging jury trial violations. Section III will also discuss the
application of the right to a jury trial standard to META and analyze
whether the arbitration approach used in META is a violation of the
employee's right to trial by jury.
II. THE EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL DOCTRINE AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF META
A. Development of the At-Will Employment Doctrine and Certain
Exceptions Created by the Courts
In the first half of the nineteenth century, the United States developed a
unique rule regarding the employment relationship of the employer and
employee.10 The rule, which became known as the "at-will doctrine," held
that employers, absent a fixed-term contract, could dismiss their employees
"for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong."" This
somewhat differently from the traditional "just cause" standard used in collective bargaining
agreements between labor unions and management. "Good cause" means job-related conduct,
including performance. It allows the employer greater flexibility in the good faith exercise of
business judgment, including setting its economic or institutional goals and determining
methods to achieve those goals. M.E.T.A. § 1(4).
8 Mandelbaum, supra note 7, at 279-80.
9 MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 (1993).
10 Jeanne Duquette Gorr, The Model Employment Termination Act: Frui(ful Seed or
Noxious Weed?, 31 DUQ. L. REv. 111, 112 (1992).
11 Payne v. Western & A.R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884).
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rule, while likewise permitting employees to leave under the same
conditions, flourished in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
12
After World War II, however, employees began to gain greater
employment protection as the result of the rise of labor unions, statutory
provisions against unjust discrimination because of race, religion, sex, age
and national origin, and the recognition of employment as a property right
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 13 As a
consequence of such enactments, many more state courts have become
"increasingly sensitive to issues of fairness and due process" 14 and have
enacted exceptions to the at-will doctrine.
During the past few decades, the state courts in forty to forty-five
jurisdictions have employed three main theories to carve out certain
exceptions to the previously prevailing employment at will doctrine. 15 The
theories include: (i) "tort violations of public policy, or 'abusive' or
'retaliatory' discharge;" 16 (ii) "breach of an express or implied contract,
embodied in a personnel manual or an oral assurance at the time of
hiring;" 17 (iii) "breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing." 18
These theories have brought greater protection to the discharged employee.
The "public policy" exception is a doctrine usually based on tort'theory
and "'recognizes a cause of action for retaliatory discharge when an
employer discharges an employee for a reason that is contrary to an
important public policy.'"19 It typically arises for three reasons:
1. An employee is discharged for "'refusing to commit an unlawful or
12 Gorr, supra note 10, at 112.
13id.
14 id. at n.7.
15 Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Model Employment Termination Act: Fairness for
Employees and Employers Alike, 43 LAB. L.J. 495, 496 (1992).
16 St. Antione, supra note 15, at 496 n.7 (citing Peterman v. Teamsters Local 396, 344
P.2d 25 (1959); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (1980)).
17 St. Antione, supra note 15, at 496 n.8 (citing Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441
(1982)).
18 St. Antione, supra note 15, at 496 n.9 (citing Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.,
364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977)).
19 Debra D. Cyranoski, Comment, The Model Employment Act: A Welcome Solution to
the Problem of Disparity Among State Laws, 37 ViLL. L. Rnv. 1527, 1543 (1992) (quoting
Comment, Employment-At-Will - Employers May Not Discharge At-Will Employees for
Reasons that Violate Public Policy - Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 1986 ARIz.
ST. L.J. 161).
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wrongful act,'"20
2. An employee is dismissed for "'performing a public obligation;'"21
or
3. An employee is terminated for "'exercising a legal right or
privilege.'"22
As an example of the first basis, a public policy exception to an employee
discharge is found where an employee has refused to violate a consumer
credit and protection law.23 In the second instance, for example, a public
policy exception is determined when an employee has reported the criminal
conduct of a fellow worker. 24 Finally, as an example of the last reason,
courts have found a public policy exception to aid an employee terminated
for filing a worker's compensation claim. 25
The breach of an express or implied contract is the next exception to
employment at will doctrine. It is based on a contract theory and "'permits
20 Cyranoski, supra note 19, at 1544.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 1546.
23 Id. at 1544 n. 116. The facts in Harless are as follows:
Plaintiff alleged that he was discharged for requiring his employer to comply with the state
and federal consumer credit and protection laws. The plaintiff was summarily fired without
being given reason. The defendant-employer asserted that the plaintiff had been an at-will
employee with nofixed duration of employment and thus it had a right to terminate without
giving any reason for doing so.
The Supreme Court of West Virginia recognized that the rule giving the employer the
absolute right to discharge an at-will employee must be tempered by the further principle that
where the employer's motivation for the discharge contravenes some substantial public policy
principle, then the employer may be liable to the employee for damages occasioned by the
discharge.
Id. (quoting Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 276 (W. Va. 1978)).
24 Cyranoski, supra note 19, at 1545-46. In Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d
380 (Ark. 1988), the court stated, "the public policy of the state is contravened if an employer
discharges an employee for reporting a violation of state or federal law." Id. at 386.
25 Cyranoski, supra note 19, at 1546. In Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297
N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973), the plaintiff was fired one month after she received a settlement as a
result of the workers' compensation claim that she had filed. According to the complaint, the
employer gave no reason for her discharge. The Supreme Court of Indiana found that the
plaintiff stated a claim for which relief could be granted. Id.
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a plaintiff to recover for breach of contract when the employer dismisses the
employee in violation of promises of employment tenure made orally or
implied from a course of conduct or from employee policies or
handbooks.'" 26 As an example, when an employer has orally assured an
employee of job security, has given him an employee handbook which
stated job termination only upon "just cause," and has subsequently fired
that employee, the employee has a rightful cause of action against the
employer for unlawful discharge.27 In addition, implied promises may not
only be derived from employer representations, but also from an
"employee's length of service and conduct."28
Finally, the last employment at will exception involves the breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. It is based on tort or
contract theory, depending on the particular jurisdiction, and "'encompasses
an obligation to refrain from interfering with the one party's right to receive
the benefits of the contract. '"'29 Under this exception, a court implies an
employer promise of good faith and fair dealing into the employment
contract to rectify bad faith discharge actions. Such bad faith actions include
firing a worker for refusing an employer instruction to make false
statements to a state legislative committee and for refusing to go on a date
with a supervisor.30
B. Current Status of the Law
Notwithstanding these advancements, however, employees are still
generally left unprotected. 31 A tort claim recovery will usually require rare,
26 Cyranoski, supra note 19, at 1538 (quoting HENRY H. PERRITr, JR., EMPLOYEE
DIsMIssAL LAW AND PRACTICE 2 (1987)).
27 See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich.
1980).
28 Cyranoski, supra note 19, at 1538.
29 d. at 1535 (quoting ANDREW D. HILL, "WRONGFUL DISCHARGE" AND THE
DEROGATION OF THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE 34 (1987)).
30 Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1959) (discharge of employee for refusing to follow his employer's instruction to make
false statements in his testimony to a state legislative committee); Monge v. Beebe Rubber
Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974) (discharge by employee's foreman because she refused to go
on a date with him).
31 St. Antoine, supra note 15, at 496. It is estimated that "[s]ome 60 million U.S.
employees that are subject to the employment at-will doctrine and about 5 million of them are
discharged each year." Id. Furthermore, "around 150,000 of these workers are discharged
unfairly under the standards applicable in unionized industries." Id. For the large number of
employees who may be wrongfully discharged, the current exceptions to the employment-at-
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egregious acts on the part of the employer. 32 To avoid a contract claim, all
the employer has to do is to refrain from future promises about job
security. 33 Furthermore, even if an employer has made a promise to the
employee in an employee handbook, courts generally allow the employer to
revoke it unilaterally as long as the employee has adequate notice.34 Finally,
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which has the potential of
providing the most protection for employees, has only been accepted by
eleven states. 35
Estimates of the American workforce subject to arbitrary discharge
under the employment at will doctrine range from fifty-five million to sixty-
five million employees. 36 In all, two million "nonprobationary, nonunion,
non-civil service" employees are discharged per year.37 Of this number,
approximately 150,000 to 200,000 employees would have a legitimate claim
under a "good cause" standard. 38 Under the current system, however, the
great majority of "successful plaintiffs are professionals or upper-level
management personnel."3 9 Rank-and-file workers "who are fired usually
have too little money at stake to make their cases worthwhile for lawyers
operating on a contingent fee basis." 40
On the other side, an employer found to have been liable under a
common-law wrongful discharge action may pay dearly.41 Studies of
California lawsuits have found that an employee who could get his claim to
will doctrine "constitute a weak reed, a fragile safeguard for the worker who has been
wronged." St. Antoine, supra note 15, at 496.
32 Id. at 487.
33 Id.
34 id.
35 See Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale
Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal.
Rptr. 722 (2 Dist. 1980); Magnan v. Anaconda Indus. Inc., 479 A.2d 781 (Conn. 1984);
Sorensen v. Comm Tek, Inc., 799 P.2d 70 (Idaho 1990); Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 431
N.E. 2d 908 (Mass. 1981); Prout v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 772 P.2d 288 (Mont. 1989);
D'Angelo v. Gardner, 819 P.2d 206 (Nev. 1991); Albee v. Wofeboro R.R. Co., 489 A.2d
148 (N.H. 1985); McQuitty v. General Dynamics Corp., 499 A.2d 526 (N.J. 1985)
(requiring an actual employment contract exist before an implied convenant of good faith and
fair dealing can be found); Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989).
36 Mandelbaum, supra note 7, at 277.
37 Peter M. Panken, Uniform Law Comissioners' Model Employment Termination Act,
C821 A.L.I - A.B.A. 109, 115 (1993).
3 8 id.
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the jury won seventy-five percent of the time and the average verdict ranged
between $300,000 and $450,000.42 One can theorize that juries are more
sympathetic to employee discharge claims since most jurors hold worker
rather than management positions within companies. The average juror
appears to have a self-interest in supporting the rights of a fellow worker.
Thus, while in front of a jury composed of "working-class people and
public and unionized employees, corporations are truly target defendants." 43
Once a plaintiff-employee makes it past the judge, the key to victory has
often been delivered.
Furthermore, companies successfully defending wrongful discharge
claims can still expect to pay between $100,000 and $200,000. 44
Additionally, hidden costs of avoiding litigation may amount to "one-
hundred times more than the adverse judgments and other legal expenses. "45
Overall, it has been concluded that the central defects in the current
common-law system "are that employees' substantive rights are too limited
and uncertain, the remedies against employers are too random and often
excessive, and the decisionmaking process is too inefficient for all
concerned. "46
Recognizing the shortcomings in judicial solutions for both employer
and employee and the fact that the courts are unlikely to significantly
expand protection against unjust dismissal, 47 scholars, practitioners, and
legislators over the past twenty-five years have started proposing legislative
solutions. 48 For instance, in 1980, a bill was introduced in the U.S. House
of Representatives to make unjust dismissal an unfair labor practice under
the National Labor Relations Act; the bill, however, did not reach non-
union employees, the most unprotected workers in the system.49
Furthermore, at the state level, in 1987, Montana became the first state in
42 St. Antoine, supra note 15, at 497.
43 Cliff Palefsky, Wrongful Termination Litigation: 'Dagwood' and Goliath, 62 MICH.
B.J. 776 (1983).
44 St. Antoine, supra note 15, at 497.
45 id.
46 Id.
47 Mandelbaum, supra note 7, at 279.
48 Gorr, supra note 10, at 116 n.33 (citing Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At-Will v.
Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLuM. L.
REy. 1404 (1967); Cornelius Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary
Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1979); and Clyde W. Summers, Individual
Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Y7me for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976)).
49 Gorr, supra note 10, at 116 (citing the Corporate Democracy Act, H.R. 7010, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980)).
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the nation to statutorily "protect" employees from "wrongful discharge."50
In addition, over the past ten years, forty out of forty-five states and
territories surveyed had indicated that bills had been introduced in their
legislatures "concerning 'employment termination, at-will employment, or a
related subject."' 51 Building on this wave of activism at the state level,
META is a recent uniform model for a solution to the problem.
C. The Model Employment Termination Act
The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws are a large cross-section of
influential lawyers, judges, law professors, and legislators from around the
country who meet annually in a national conference and quarterly in smaller
committees to prepare and adopt bills to serve as model enactments for state
legislatures. 52 In 1985, the Uniform Law Commissioners' Executive
Committee approved the formation of a promulgating committee to draft a
Uniform Wrongful Termination Act.5 3 The approval was based in part on
studies "indicating that recent judicial modifications in the doctrine of
employment at will had created great uncertainty for both employers and
employees."54 After six years of intensive activity, the subcommittee
produced the Model Employment Termination Act.55 At the 1991 Annual
Conference of Uniform Commissioners on State Laws, the Employment
Termination Act was formally approved as a Model Act. 56
The promulgating committee of the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws described the "underlying theme" of the Model Act as "one of
compromise." 57 The quid pro quo includes the following: in exchange for
the abandonment of the "at-will" standard, covered employees are granted
an expanded substantive right to "good cause" protection against wrongful
discharge in an arbitration setting.58 Under section 1(4) of META, the
"good cause" standard is defined as "(i) a reasonable basis related to an
individual employee for termination... in view of relevant factors and
50 Leonard Bierman & Stuart A. Youngblood, Interpreting Montana's Pathbreaking
Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 53 MoNT. L. Rnv. 53
(1992). The act takes away all common law rights of the employee in return for a "good
cause" (reasonable job-related basis) justification for termination of employment. Id. at 59.
51 Gorr, supra note 10, at 116 (citing M.E.T.A. § 4).
52 St. Antoine, supra note 15, at 496.
53 Bedikian, supra note 2, at 116.
54 Panken, supra note 37, at 114.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 115.
57 Mandelbaum, supra note 7, at 279.
58 M.E.T.A. §§ 1(4), 6; see also Mandelbaum, supra note 7, at 279.
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circumstances, which may include the employee's duties, responsibilities,
conduct on the job or otherwise job performance .... or (ii) the exercise of
business judgment in good faith by the employer, including setting its
economic or institutional goals. " 59 Thus, the "good cause" standard is
meant to be applied somewhat differently from the traditional "just cause"
standard used in collective bargaining agreements between labor unions and
management. META allows the employer greater flexibility in the good
faith exercise of business judgment, including setting its economic or
institutional goals and determining methods to achieve those goals.
Under section 2, the scope of the Act "displaces and extinguishes all
common-law rights," including a right to a jury trial, of a terminated
employee against the employer and replaces them with the discharge
requirement that employers meet a standard of "good cause" before an
arbitrator of the state. 60 When a successful claim is brought, the arbitration
award is limited to reinstatement, with or without backpay, and severance
pay when reinstatement is infeasible. 61 Also, compensatory and punitive
damages are eliminated. 62 The arbitrator's decision is necessarily binding
and only may be vacated or modified by a reviewing court of law if the
court finds corruption, conflict of interest, excessive use of arbitral powers,
or prejudicial error of law. 63
META is similar to other alternative dispute resolution systems in that
it searches for conflict resolution that is more efficient than the traditional
process and provides a better quality of dispute resolution. 64 When
arbitration is imposed by law for a claim currently decided by jurors, the
constitutional issue of a right to trial by jury emerges. This aspect of the
Act appears to have been a concern for some members of the Uniform
Commission. That concern is why META has an alternative provision for
states concerned about possible constitutional problems concerning the right
to jury trial. In the appendix of the Model Act, under Alternative A, it
provides an alternative of enforcement in the hands of a state administrative
agency and, under Alternative B, under the care of the civil courts. 65
By providing an alternative procedure for states to adopt, it is evident
that a majority of the members of the Uniform Commission had a concern
over the possible violation of an employee's constitutional right to a jury
5 9 M.E.T.A. §§ 1(4), 6.
60 Id. § 2(c); see also Mandelbaum, supra note 7, at 279-80.
61 M.E.T.A. § 7; see also Mandelbaum, supra note 7, at 279.
62 M.E.T.A. § 7; see also Mandelbaum, supra note 7, at 279.
63 M.E.T.A. § 8(c); see also Panken, supra note 37, at 132.
64 Dwight Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The
Constitutional Issues, 68 OR. L. Rxv. 487, 490 (1989).
65 Alternative A reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
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trial in wrongful discharge disputes. The question arises, then, whether the
use of mandatory binding arbitration in the primary Act itself, which
compels arbitration by law rather than by contract or volition, violates the
employee's constitutional right to a jury trial.
III. DOES META VIOLATE THE EMPLOYEE'S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY?
A. The Right to Jury Trial
The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
the right to trial by jury in civil actions in federal courts. 66 It explicitly
provides that "[imn Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."67
In Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,68 the Supreme Court highlighted the
importance of the Seventh Amendment jury right when it stated:
"'Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and
occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming
curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost
care."' 69 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has declined to treat the Seventh
Amendment civil jury trial as applicable to the states through the
requirement of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.70
The constitutions of forty-eight states, however, contain a similar guarantee
that the right to jury trial shall be preserved inviolate.71 While there are
SECTION 5. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
Insert provisions consigning enforcement of the [Act] to a new or existing
administrative agency, staffed by civil service or other governmental personnel,
operating under applicable state statutes.
M.E.T.A. app A § 5.
Alternative B reads (in pertinent part) as follows:
SECTION 5. JUDICIAL REMEDIES
Alternative B would leave the enforcement of the statute to the civil courts.
M.E.T.A. app. A § 5.
66 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
67 id.
68 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
69 Id. at 501 (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)).
70 Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876).
71 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 21. Colorado and
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some differences among the provisions, 72 they have been given an essential
uniform effect for the purposes of this discussion.
B. The Historical Test of the Right to Jury Trial
The right to jury trial is preserved and reviewed by what is called the
historical test.73 This standard generally means that the state and federal
constitutions preserve "the right of jury trial as it existed in English history
at some past time, either in 1791 when the Seventh Amendment was
adopted or, in the case of the states, at the date of the first state
constitution. "74 Under the historical test, litigants are entitled to have a
claim presented to a jury if "the claim would have received a jury trial
under the common law of England at the time the Constitution was
ratified." 75
At common law, not all civil matters were tried to a jury. A jury trial
was customary in suits brought in English law courts, while it was not in
courts of equity. 76 Thus, at common law, if a claim was a legal action
before a law court so that it might receive a "legal" remedy, a jury trial
right existed; if a claim was an equity action so that it might receive an
equitable remedy, there was no jury trial right.
In addition, the Supreme Court has construed the language of the
Seventh Amendment to require a "jury trial on the merits in those actions
that are analogous to 'Suits at common law.'"'77 In Parsons v. Bedford,78
the Supreme Court stated the term "Suits at common law" refers to "'suits
in which legal rights [are] to be ascertained and determined, in
contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone [are] recognized, and
Louisiana have no constitutional guarantee of jury trial for civil actions.
7 2 See Fleming James, Jr., Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 657
n.15 (1963)) (quoting LOUISELL & HAzARD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND
PROCEDURE 938 (1962)("In the states which have them, the constitutional guarantees of jury
trial in civil cases usually are phrased in strong but not very detailed language. The
constitutional authors generally were content to provide that trial by jury 'shall remain
inviolate forever,' 'shall remain inviolate,' 'shall be secured,' 'shall remain as heretofore,'
etc.... At least implicitly the purport is that the right shall remain in substance as it was
when the state constitutional provision was adopted.")).
73 James, supra note 72, at 657.
74 Id. at 655.
75 Golann, supra note 64, at 503 (citing Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241
U.S. 211, 217 (1916)).
76 Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987).
77 id
.78 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830).
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equitable remedies [are] administered. ,,,79 The Supreme Court went on to
state, "[t]he Amendment then may well be construed to embrace all suits
which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may be the
peculiar form which they may assume to settle legal rights."80 This analysis
applies not only to common-law forms of action, but extends to causes of
action created by Congress where legal rights are at stake. 81
The historical test's legal/equitable remedy distinction remains the
standard today. This is so even though the American court system has
merged the equity/legal distinction into one united procedure. With the
merger of procedures for claims at law and claims at equity in the American
court system today, this historical test seems antiquated and even
"irrational." ' 82 Nevertheless, neither the courts, the state legislatures, nor
Congress has changed the applicable historical test standard for determining
right to jury trial violations.
To determine whether a particular action will resolve legal rights, both
the nature of the issues involved and the remedy sought are examined.83
Thus, the historical test analysis has two steps: first, the modem statutory
action in dispute is compared to the 18th-century actions brought in the
courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity;
second, the remedy sought is examined by determining whether it is legal or
equitable in nature. 84 The Supreme Court has stated that the second inquiry
is the more important of the two. 85
Under the first prong, if an action would have been brought before a
court of law in England, then it is legal in nature and generally requires a
trial by jury. Otherwise, it is an equitable action. An example of an action
legal in nature is breach of contract since this type of action was brought
before a court of law under the common law of England. Under the second
prong, if the remedy sought is one for which only a court of law in England
had the power to institute, then the remedy is a legal one. Otherwise, the
damage is equitable. An example of a legal remedy is punitive damages. An
example of an equitable damage award is an injunction.
Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry 86 is a
79 Parsons, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 447.
80 Id. at 447.
81 Tullv. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987).
82 Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 33, 74-75.
83 Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565
(1990).
84 Id. (citing Tull, 481 U.S. at 417-18).
85 id.
86 494 U.S. 558, 558.
452
[Vol. 10:2 1995]
MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT
recent example of an application of the historical test. In this case, a laid-off
truckdriver of McLean Trucking Company brought suit against his
employer alleging that the employer breached the collective bargaining
agreement by revoking the special seniority rights "guaranteed" to him in
return for agreeing to transfer to a terminal in another town and against his
union for violating the duty of fair representation for failing to process his
employee grievance.87 In the meantime, McLean Trucking Company filed
for bankruptcy, and the action against it, and all claims for injunctive relief
were dismissed. 88 While hearing the remaining duty of fair representation
claim in which the employee sought relief in the form of backpay, the trial
court denied the union's motion to strike the plaintiff's demand for a jury
trial.89
After the court of appeals affirmed, 90 the U.S. Supreme Court, in
applying the two-step historical test, upheld the trial court decision as
well. 91 The Court took note that whether the employee sues both the labor
union and the employer or only one of them, he "must prove the same two
facts to recover money damages: that the employer's action violated the
terms of the collective-bargaining agreement and that the union breached its
duty of fair representation. "92 In applying the first prong of the historical
test to that distinction, Justice Marshall, speaking for a plurality of four,
stated the breach of the collective bargaining agreement claim against the
employer is analogous to the legal claim of breach of contract while the
duty of fair representation issue is analogous to an equitable claim against a
trustee for breach of fiduciary duty. 93 Therefore, the nature of the
employee's action encompasses both legal and equitable issues and so the
first part of the Seventh Amendment inquiry leaves the analysis in
"equipoise" or a state of equilibrium. 94
Applying the second inquiry of the historical test, the Court majority
stated that an action for money damages in general was "'the traditional
form of relief offered in the courts of law.'"" The Court stated first that,
87 Chauffers, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391, 494 U.S. at 561-62.
88 Id. at 562.
89 Chauffers, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 676 F. Supp. 659
(M.D.N.C. 1986), aff'd, 863 F.2d 334 (4th Cir. 1988), aft'd, 494 U.S. 558 (1990).
90 Chauffers, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 863 F.2d 334 (4th Cir.
1988), aff'd, 494 U.S. 558 (1990).
91 Chauffers, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 562
(1990).
92 Id. at 564.
93 Id. at 569-70.
94 Id. at 570.
95 Chauffers, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391, 494 U.S. at 570. (quoting Curtis
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even though the restititution of wages and benefits may be an equitable
remedy against an employer, it is a legal remedy against a labor union since
the union's failure to process the employee's grievance properly cost the
employee wages and benefits he would have received from the employer. 96
The Court argued that such relief is not restititutionary. Second, it asserted
that a monetary award "'incidental to or intertwined with injunctive relief"
may be equitable but since, in this case, the employee was only seeking
monetary damages, the remedy sought is legal in nature. 97 The Court then
concluded that since the first part of the historical test was a "toss-up" while
the second part was "clearly" legal in nature and more important to the
Seventh Amendment determination, the employee, therefore, has a right to a
trial by jury on his action against the union. 98
C. Application of the Historical Test and Supreme Court Precedent
to META
To determine whether META violates the right to trial by jury by
failing to properly resolve the legal rights of a discharged employee, both
the nature of the issues involved and the remedy sought will be examined. 99
As was noted earlier, the historical test analysis involves two steps: first,
the modem statutory action in dispute is compared to the 18th-century
actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of
law and equity; second, the remedy sought is examined by determining
whether it is legal or equitable in nature.100
1. Analyzing the Nature of the Issues Involved
Under the first prong of the historical test, the pre-merger custom is
analyzed. In applying this step, the "question then arises whether the
[historical test] freezes the right absolutely as it was in England in 1791, or
whether it has some elasticity so as to accomodate extensions or contractions
of jury trial and, if so, what the limits of this elasticity may be."10 1 META
would appear on its face not to violate an employee's right to jury trial
because the right of "good cause" wrongful discharge did not exist under
v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974)).
96 Chauffers, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 562
(1990).
97 Id. (quoting Tull v. U.S., 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987)).
98 Id. at 573.
99 See id. at 565.
100 Id. (citing Tull, 481 U.S. at 417-18).
101 James, supra note 72, at 657.
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the English common law. However, one of the reasons the current wrongful
discharge dispute requires a jury trial is because it is analogous to the
common-law right of breach of contract. One could assert that the new
"good cause" wrongful discharge dispute is similarly analogous to the
common-law right of breach of contract.
Based on the traditional standard for extensions of a right to jury trial
to claims that resemble common-law rights, a "good cause" wrongful
discharge claim would appear to constitutionally require a jury trial. In Ross
v. Bernard,1°2 the Supreme Court, in upholding the traditional standard,
held that a stockholders' derivative suit, a type of suit traditionally brought
in courts of equity, requires a right to jury trial because the plaintiffs' case
presented legal issues of breach of contract and negligence. 103
META is somewhat different in that it extinguishes the employee's
right to trial by jury for a legal cause of action, the wrongful discharge
claim, and institutes a mandatory arbitration proceeding adjudicating a new
cause of action, the "good cause" wrongful discharge action. One of the
most serious constitutional questions raised by proposals to make dispute
resolution mandatory is the potential impairment of a litigant's right to a
jury trial. The phrase "mandatory alternative dispute resolution" includes
"both those processes which require participation but allow disputants to
reject the [alternative dispute resolution] outcome and try their cases in
court, and those processes which have binding outcomes, enforceable with
only limited appellate review. " 104 META represents the latter.105
The key factors in analyzing the constitutionality of alternative dispute
resolution are, "first, whether a [dispute] process applies to legal causes of
action and, second, the extent to which the outcome of the process, as well
as participation in it, is mandatory." 106 The claim of wrongful discharge
closely resembles the old common law legal claim of breach of contract so
that a jury trial is constitutionally required. Thus, legal claims such as
wrongful discharge which are subject to mandatory arbitration violate the
Seventh Amendment's jury trial requirement. However, META sidesteps
the first issue by replacing the old wrongful discharge legal claim and
creating a new cause of action, with a "good cause" standard, for the
employee against the employer. Therefore, no need exists to reach the
second issue.
This change appears constitutional since other new rights and remedies,
over the course of U.S. history, have been created since the adoption of the
102 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
103 Id.
104 Golann, supra note 64, at 494.
105 Mandelbaum, supra note 7, at 279-80.
106 Golann, supra note 64, at 503.
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federal and state constitutions. 10 7 In a similar fashion, META creates a new
right for the employee by holding the employer to a "good cause" standard
for termination decisions. In devising new remedies, the "legislature has
considerable latitude to determine whether they shall carry a right to jury
trial." 108 Generally, because alternative dispute resolution does not provide
jury trials, "the only way to apply binding dispute resolution to jury claims
is to transform those claims so that they no longer carry jury trial rights." °109
The above analysis is based on the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has
held, in Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 10 that a legislature may even
abolish a common-law remedy, such as the right of an employee to sue his
employer in tort for job-related injuries, and substitute for it an entirely new
system of compensation for all industrial injuries to be administered by a
board or commission which will determine factual disputes without resort to
either court or jury (e.g., workers' compensation statutes)."' This is
constitutionally permissible because the traditional jury trial has been
eliminated as an option since the removal of the element of fault from
workers' compensation actions has transformed the actions to such an extent
that they need not be tried by a jury. n2
It is questionable, however, whether the new "good cause" standard
adopted in META has transformed the wrongful discharge claim to such an
extent that these claims no longer require a jury. Generally, "unless an
action is transformed, . . . dispute resolution programs must allow
participants with jury claims the option to reject [alternative dispute
resolution] results and elect traditional jury trials."" 3 Determining if a
common-law action has been sufficiently transformed is dependent on how
extensive is the modification of the traditional cause of action. 114
When a jury is instructed to decide a possible exception of the at-will
doctrine to the wrongful discharge claim, it determines whether a justifiable
reason exists for reversing the employer's decision to terminate the
employee. The workers' compensation situation appears distinguishable
from the "good cause" termination case of META because, in the former,
107 E.g., Mountain Timber v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917) (upholding the
constitutionality of a workers' compensation statute).
108 James, supra note 72, at 655 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 48-49 (1937) (holding an administrative finding of unfair labor practice to be
proper)).
109 Golann, supra note 64, at 504.
110 243 U.S. 219 (1917).
n11 Id.
112 Id. at 235.
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fault is no longer an issue for the jury. All that is necessary is to prove
work-related injury and to determine damages. The most important jury
question has been sufficiently transformed.
In the META situation, however, a similar jury issue to the earlier
wrongful discharge claim still exists: Did the employer have a good cause
justification for terminating the employee? Thus, the common-law action of
wrongful discharge has not been sufficiently transformed through the new
"good cause" right. The "justifiable" termination issue for a wrongful
discharge claim still remains. Thus, in its current form, META short-
changes the employee's right to a jury determination on the issue of the
employer's decision to terminate and instead requires mandatory arbitration
with limited review.
The new "good cause" right does not sufficiently transform the
common-law right of wrongful discharge. A legislature is subject to certain
limits in transforming a common-law right brought before a jury into a new
claim disputed and determined under alternative dispute resolution. If a
legislature creates a right to be redressed by an action which is analogous to
a common-law action, the legislative body "probably may not deprive the
parties to the action of a right to jury trial."115 Thus, the question arises as
to what are the constitutional limits to the elasticity allowed a state
legislature in transforming the employee's common-law right subject to jury
trial into a new "good cause" termination right against the employer subject
to binding arbitration.
As was pointed out earlier, the Supreme Court, in Parsons v.
Bedford,116 held that if a legislature creates a right to be redressed by an
action which is analogous to a common law tort action, "it probably may
not deprive the parties to the action of a right to jury trial."117 The "good
cause" standard in META is at least analogous to the existing implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing exception to the at-will doctrine, if
not the two other wrongful discharge theories. Section 1(4) of META
defines the "good cause" standard as "(i) a reasonable basis related to an
individual employee for termination ... in view of relevant factors and
circumstances, which may include the employee's duties, responsibilities,
conduct on the job or otherwise job performance .... or (ii) the exercise of
business judgment in good faith by the employer, including setting its
economic or institutional goals." 1 8
115 James, supra note 72, at 656 (citing Parsons v. United States, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433,
447 (1830)). For compensatory damages caused by wrongful death, the right to jury trial
probably could not be waived.
116 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 433.
117 James, supra note 72, at 656 (citing Parsons, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 447).
118 M.E.T.A. § 1(4).
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Under the good faith and fair dealing exception, a court implies an
employer's promise of good faith and fair dealing into the employment
contract to rectify bad faith discharge actions on the part of the employer
against the worker. A bad discharge is committed when an employer, acting
in bad faith, discharges an employee who has established contractual rights
of continued employment and who has developed a relationship of trust,
reliance, and dependency with the employer. Such bad faith actions include
firing a worker for refusing an employer instruction to make false
statements to a state legislative committee and for refusing to go on a date
with a supervisor.
The "good cause" claim does not change the applicable standard of
analysis. Therefore, in those eleven states that have an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing exception, META's good cause termination
standard is analogous to an existing common-law right. In those eleven
states, META would violate the employee's right to jury trial. 119
In addition, the Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between public
rights and private rights created by statute and enforced in non-jury
settings. 120 Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm., 121 involved Congress' creating a legal claim by statute against
unsafe working conditions in the workplace. Any alleged violations are
assigned to administrative agency adjudication. 122 The Court found this
action not to be a violation of the employer's Seventh Amendment jury
right:123 It firmly stated:
At least in cases in which "public rights" are being litigated, e.g.,
cases in which the Government sues in its sovereign capacity to enforce
119 The states include Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Idaho, Massachusetts,
Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Nevada, and Utah. See Mitford v. de Lasala, 666
P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz.
1985); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (2 Dist. 1980); Magnan v.
Anaconda Indus., Inc., 479 A.2d 781 (Conn. 1984); Sorensen v. Comm Tek, Inc., 799 P.2d
70 (Idaho 1990); Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 431 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 1982); Prout v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 772 P.2d 288 (Mont. 1989); D'Angelo v. Gardner, 819 P.2d 206 (Nev.
1991); Albee v. Wofeboro R.R. Co., 489 A.2d 148 (N.H. 1985); McQuitty v. General
Dynamics Corp., 499 A.2d 526 (N.J. 1985) (requiring an actual employment contract exist,
before an implied convenant of good faith and fair dealing can be found); Berube v. Fashion
Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989).
120 See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm., 430 U.S.
442, 450 n.7 (1977).
121 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
12
2 id.
123 Id. at 450.
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public rights created by statutes within the power of Congress to enact the
Seventh Amendment does not prohibit Congress from assigning the
factf'mding function and initial adjudication to an administrative forum
with which the jury would be incompatible.124
The Court explicitly noted in a footnote that the enforcement of the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations does not involve
purely "private rights" 125 like the one found in META. It stated, that in
cases which involve only "private rights" created by Congress, it is
acceptable to have "factfinding by an administrative agency, without
intervention by a jury, only as an adjunct to an Article Ill court created" 126
by Congress. Thus, for Congress to create a private right for a "good
cause" standard for wrongful discharge that is enforceable without a jury as
factfinder, it would need to create a state or federal agency to enforce the
right and not only rely on an arbitrator's decision on the matter.
META does suggest that an existing state agency administer the
program by adopting rules regulating selection and qualification of
arbitrators. 127 But it does not require a "new" or existing state agency to
actually make the arbitration decisions. It does offer this alternative
approach in Appendix A of the Model Act. 128 But from a federal law
perspective, META, in its primary form, would appear to be in violation of
the Atlas Roofing requirement that an agency act as a factfinding "adjunct to
an Article III court."129 Therefore, META, in its primary form, appears to
violate at least the Seventh Amendment's right to jury trial. As was noted
earlier, the Seventh Amendment is not applicable to the states through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so some states may be
able to sidestep this deficiency in META.
Certain Supreme Court cases are distinguishable from the historical
test's first prong constitutional problems of META. In Block v. Hirsh,130
the Supreme Court sustained Congress' power to pass a statute applicable to
the District of Columbia which temporarily suspended a landlord's legal
remedy of ejectment and relegated him to an administrative fact finding
forum charged with determining fair rents at which tenants could hold over
despite the expiration of their leases. The Court ruled no violation of the
124 Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 450 (emphasis added).
125 Id. at 450 n.7.
126 id.
127 Mandelbaum, supra note 7, at 280 (citing draft M.E.T.A. § 5(c) at 25).
128 M.E.T.A. app. A § 5.
129 Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm. 430 U.S. 442,
450 n.7 (1977).
130 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
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right to jury trial occurred because the ejectment right of the employer was
only temporarily suspended and Congress had intended a speedy resolution
for landlord-tenant rent disputes. 131 Even if META admirably seeks speedy
resolution of employer-employee wrongful discharge disputes, it is not a
temporary suspension of an employee's right to bring his claim before a
jury. Therefore, the Block case is inapplicable to the META situation.
In addition, the Court in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.132
addressed the Seventh Amendment jury right question in relation to the
creation of the National Labor Relations Act, where a new federal agency,
the National Labor Relations Board, would determine unfair labor practices
on the part of an employer or union. 133 The Court found no violation of the
right to jury trial since under the historical test's first-prong standard an
unfair labor practice proceeding "is not a suit at common law or in the
nature of such a suit." 134 In Curtis v. Loether,135 the Court further clarified
its Jones & Laughlin holding when it stated that Jones & Laughlin upheld
"congressional power to entrust enforcement of statutory rights to an
administrative process or specialized court of equity free from the strictures
of the Seventh Amendment." 136 Curtis rejected the argument that Jones &
Laughlin held the Seventh Amendment inapplicable to any action based on a
statutorily created right even if the action was brought before a tribunal
which customarily utilizes a jury as its fact-finding arm. 137 Thus, Jones &
Laughlin would be inapplicable to META since META, in its primary
form, does not permit a state agency to decide the dispute, and wrongful
discharge is an extension of the common-law right of breach of contract.
Furthermore, as was noted earlier, with the Court's decision in Atlas
Roofing,138 a legislature can only subject a new statutory "private" right to
an agency which is an adjunct to an Article III court. 139 The NLRB is just
such an agency while an arbitrator is not.
With the above precedent in mind, META, in its primary form,
violates the first prong of the historical test for two reasons. First, a
wrongful discharge claim by an employee against an employer is an
extension of the common-law right of breach of contract. Therefore, it
131 Block, 256 U.S. 135.
132 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 48-49.
135 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
136 
Id. at 194-95.
137 Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 1, 1 (1937).
138 Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Conn. 430 U.S. 442
(1977).
139 Id. at 450 n.7.
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requires a jury trial. The historical test's "nature of issue" step prevents a
legislative body from creating a "new" cause of action without a jury trial
that does not sufficiently transform the wrongful discharge claim to such an
extent that these claims no longer require a jury. In states that have adopted
the good faith and fair dealing exception to the at-will doctrine, META
violates the right to trial by jury by failing to sufficiently transform the
common-law right.
Second, under federal law, a legislative body cannot create a new
"private" statutory right without having the claim adjudicated by a fact-
finding agency that is an adjunct of an Article III court. Therefore, under
Supreme Court precedent, META's creation of a "private" good cause
wrongful termination claim before a state-appointed arbitrator violates the
employee's right to jury trial. For Congress to create a private right for a
"good cause" standard for wrongful discharge that is enforceable without a
jury as factfinder, it would need to create a state or federal agency to
enforce the right and not rely only on an arbitrator's decision on the matter.
In states that have not adopted the good faith and fair dealing exception or
need not follow the Supreme Court precedent requiring a state agency to
administer the adjudication of the new right, META appears constitutional
otherwise. However, it may still violate the second prong of the historical
test which analyzes the remedy sought by the employee-claimant.
2. Analyzing the Nature of the Remedies
Under the second prong of the historical test, the remedy sought is
examined by determining whether it is legal or equitable in nature. 140 As the
Court noted in Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391,141 the
second prong is more important than the first in deciding a legal action and
therefore a constitutionally-required right to a jury trial. Under the second
prong of the historical test, if the remedy sought is one which only a court
of law in England had the power to institute, then the remedy is a legal one.
Otherwise, the damage is equitable.
Under the common-law right of wrongful discharge, if an employee
sues an employer based on contract theory, the employee can possibly
recover the following damages: compensatory damages like backpay and
loss of fringe benefits, reinstatement, and frontpay if reinstatement is
infeasible. If an employee bases the wrongful discharge claim on tort
theory, 142 the person possibly can recover the following damages:
140 Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565
(1990) (citing Tull, 481 U.S. at 417-18).
141 Id. at 558.
142 For example, the public policy tort exception to the at-will doctrine is an example of
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compensatory damages like backpay and loss of fringe benefits,
reinstatement, severance pay if reinstatement is infeasible, pain and
suffering, emotional distress damages, and punitive damages.
Under META, when a successful claim is brought, the arbitration
award is limited to reinstatement, with or without backpay, and severance
pay when reinstatement is infeasible. 143 Also, compensatory and punitive
damages are eliminated. 144 Thus, META "preempts and eliminates the
public policy tort."145 On the other hand, the general remedies available for
contract-based wrongful discharge have remained in META.
a. Comparing META to Contract-Based Wrongful Discharge
In analyzing the common-law right of wrongful discharge as
differentiated from the changes made in META, it should be noted that the
remedies available under contract theory for wrongful discharge claims,
including the recovery of backpay and loss of fringe benefits and even
reinstatement, have not been changed by META. The only major difference
is that under META an arbitrator, rather than a jury, decides the award of
these damages.
All of the types of remedies available under both META and contract-
based wrongful discharge claims are equitable. The Supreme Court has held
that the recovery for backpay relief from an employer by an employee based
on a Title VII discrimination action under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a
type of restitution that is equitable.146 Restitution is used for "restoring the
status quo and ordering the return of that which rightfully belongs" to
another. 147 A right to jury trial is not required for these types of remedies
under Title VII. Thus, by analogy, the recovery of backpay and fringe
benefits in a wrongful discharge claim does not require a jury trial for their
determination either.
The call for reinstatement is also an equitable remedy. It is a form of an
injunction which was only ordered by courts of equity in England.
Furthermore, if a monetary award is "incidental to or intertwined with
injunctive relief,"1 48 it is more likely to be held equitable as well. A "court
in equity was empowered to provide monetary awards that were incidental
a wrongful discharge claim based on tort theory.
143 M.E.T.A. § 7; see also Mandelbaum, supra note 7, at 279.
144 M.E.T.A. § 7.
145 Tobias, supra note 5, at 501.
146 Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1974).
147 Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 402 (1946).
148 Chauffers, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 573
(1990) (citing Tull v. U.S., 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987)).
462
[V/ol. 10:2 1995]
MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT
to or intertwined with injunctive relief." 149 Thus, META, as compared to
contract-based wrongful discharge, does not violate the right to trial by jury
since the remedies are still the same-equitable in both regards.
b. Comparing META to Tort-Based Wrongful Discharge
As was noted earlier, if an employee bases the wrongful discharge
claim on tort theory, 150 the person possibly can recover the following:
compensatory damages (like backpay and loss of fringe benefits),
reinstatement, severance pay if reinstatement is infeasible, punitive
damages, damages for pain and suffering, and emotional distress.
On the other hand, under META, when a successful claim is brought,
the arbitration award is limited to reinstatement, with or without backpay,
and severance pay when reinstatement is infeasible.151 Other compensatory
and punitive damages are eliminated from the arbitration award.15 2
The fact that META removes the damages claim for reinstatement and
possible backpay and severance pay to an arbitrator instead of a jury is
constitutionally permissible since they are equitable damages. However, in
addition, META eliminates altogether the awards for pain and suffering,
emotional distress damages, and punitive damages.
Pain and suffering and emotional distress damages are forms of
compensatory damages. Like restitution damages that are ordered to restore
the status quo, compensatory damages were administered by the courts of
equity in England. 153 Punitive damages, on the other hand, are legal
relief. 154
The Tull court asserted that "[r]emedies intended to punish culpable
individuals, as opposed to those intended simply to extract compensation or
restore the status quo, were issued by courts of law, not courts of
equity." 155 Although META strips employees completely of their legal
common-law right to pursue punitive damages against the employer when
they have been the victim of outrageous and cruel terminations, the Seventh
Amendment is not violated since the arbitrator is not enforcing punitive
damages. Thus, META's elimination of punitive damages will be rendered
constitutional since a court generally gives the legislature discretion to make
149 Tull, 481 U.S. at 424.
150 For example, the public policy tort exception to the at will doctrine is an example of
a wrongful discharge claim based on tort theory.
151 M.E.T.A. § 7; see also Mandelbaum, supra note 7, at 279.
15 2 M.E.T.A. § 7.
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changes in creating a new cause of action and will not interrupt the
operation of the political process. Therefore, under the second prong of the
historical test, the remedy sought under META is equitable and an
arbitrator can constitutionally render decisions of reinstatement, backpay,
and severance pay. A jury is not constitutionally required.
Since the second-prong analysis has shown that META does not allow
for any legal remedies to be decided without a jury, no further grounds are
available for finding that META violates the employee's right to jury trial.
Furthermore, because of the fact that the second prong is generally more
important than the first in deciding a legal action under the historical test
standard, 156 the constitutionality of the second prong analysis may even
"trump" the unconstitutionality found in the first prong. The first prong
trouble spots include the insufficient transformation of a common-law at-
will exception of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into a
"good cause" action without the benefit of a jury and the failure of META,
in its primary form, to create a state agency to "adjudicate" the newly-
developed "private" right of the employee.
Yet, nonetheless, a violation of the right to trial by jury for the above
two reasons should still be found. This is so because the "Seventh
Amendment question depends on the nature of the issue to be tried rather
than the character of the overall action." 157 In Ross, the Supreme Court
found a right to jury trial in a shareholders' derivative suit, a type of suit
traditionally brought in courts of equity, because the plaintiffs' case
presented legal issues of breach of contract and negligence.158 The Ross
decision stands for the proposition that the Seventh Amendment preserves to
litigants the right to jury trial not merely in suits which the common law
recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but also in suits in which
legal rights were to be ascertained and determined. 159 This is in
contradistinction to those occasions where equitable rights along with
recognized and equitable remedies were administered.1 60 Under the "good
cause" claim of META, even though this claim did not exist at the common
law, the legal right of breach of contract still needs to be determined in this
action. Even though an equitable remedy may be the only recourse under
the Model Act, a legal right still needs to be adjudicated. At the very least,
on the issue of employer liability, a jury trial is constitutionally required.
The second violation of the first prong of the historical test involves the
failure of META, in its primary form, to create a state agency to
156 Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990).
157 Ross v. Bernard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
158 id.
159 id.
160 Id. at 533 (citing Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830)).
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"adjudicate" the newly-developed "private" right of the employee. This
aspect of META likewise should be determinative of its unconstitutionality.
Again, under Ross, the "Seventh Amendment question depends on the
nature of the issue to be tried rather than the character of the overall
action." 161 META removes from the courts the determination of a legal
right of possible breach of contract. The court in Atlas 162 stated that in
cases which involve only "private rights" created by Congress, it is
acceptable to have "factfinding by an administrative agency, without
intervention by a jury, only as an adjunct to an Article III court created by
Congress." 163 Thus, for Congress or even a state, for that matter, to create
a private right for a "good cause" standard for wrongful discharge that is
enforceable without a jury as factfinder, it would need to create a state or
federal agency to enforce the right and not rely only on a arbitrator's
decision on the matter.
This outcome is necessary for public policy reasons as well. For many
workers in today's society, the job has replaced "home, family, church,
neighborhood, and community as the primary source of [one's] identity,
object of loyalty, and major social unit. " 164 For an employee to have his job
termination claim subject to the decision of an arbitrator goes against the
ultimate goal of making one's community the judge of one's actions in
which a person's identity - indeed, his job - is at stake.
The right to jury trial is certainly not absolute. However, in the
wrongful discharge setting, an individual is entitled to just recourse and
compensation. META shortchanges employees in a current world where the
average employee already is in an inequitable bargaining position with the
employer. A jury trial may give the employee somewhat of a "home field
advantage" against the employer since the jurors are composed largely of
workers themselves. However, the right to trial by jury was created for a
similar reason: to protect the citizen from unjust governmental dominance in
the legal setting and to allow a group of his peers and members of his
community to judge him for the merits of his case. An employee deserves
the very same against a much more powerful employer. Therefore, for those
reasons, the second prong should not trump the first prong of the historical
test where the right to jury trial protects against unlawful transformation of
a common law right into a new cause of action that utilizes binding
arbitration and where a state agency is required to administer the decisions
for a newly-created statutory, "private" right. Therefore, in these two
161 Ross, 396 U.S. 531, 531.
162 Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm., 430 U.S. 442
(1977).
163 Id. at 450 n.7.
164 Gorr, supra note 10, at 113.
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instances, META violates an employee's constitutional right to jury trial.
IV. CONCLUSION
With the above analysis in mind, META, in its primary form, is a
constitutional violation of an employee's right to trial by jury in two
respects. First of all, the current wrongful discharge claim by an employee
against an employer is an extension of the common law right of breach of
contract. META's new "good cause" standard does not change this fact; the
claim is still the determination of a legal right of breach of contract.
The first prong of the historical test prevents a legislative body from
insufficiently transforming this type of action and having it decided without
the benefit of a jury. In at least those states that have an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing exception to the at-will doctrine, META violates
the employee's right to trial by jury since the new claim has been
insufficiently transformed in order to be decided through the use of binding
arbitration. The legal right of breach of contract and the standard of "good
cause" termination in fact are unchanged in reality. META could overcome
this constitutional defect by making the arbitration voluntary and giving the
employee the choice to reject arbitration and proceed before a jury.
Second, under federal law, a legislative body cannot create a new
"private" statutory right without having the claim adjudicated by a fact-
finding agency that is an adjunct of an Article III court. Therefore, even
without the benefit of violating the second prong of the historical test
relating to the nature of the remedy, under Supreme Court precedent,
META's creation of a "private" good cause wrongful termination claim
before an arbitrator violates the employee's right to jury trial.
META is an admirable start. The at-will doctrine has been criticized
because of economic realities, the modem worker's quest for security in the
workplace, and the respect for human dignity. The modem age of
increasing technology, specialization of skills, and an unstable economy
leave a very risky and unpredictable situation for the worker whose
livelihood depends entirely on his labor. Furthermore, the current
exceptions to the at-will doctrine have not been applied consistently by the
courts, have become expensive, and are time-consuming in nature.
META is a welcome offer to the continuing debate of the
appropriateness of employment at-will doctrine and its growing exceptions.
Unfortunately, in its mission to strike a compromise between employer and
employees, the Model Act's quid pro quo has unfairly short-changed the
least powerful of the two parties. META, in its primary form, violates the
employee's constitutional right to trial by jury by first mandating arbitration
under an insufficient transformation of a common law right and second,
creating a statutory private right without adjudication from an agency which
466
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is an adjunct of an Article I court.
With regard to the latter, some states may not follow the Supreme
Court precedent since they are not bound by it. They are not bound since
the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial is not applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. However, states
will still have a hard time bypassing their own constitutions, many of which
protect the right to jury trial "inviolate" as opposed to mere preservation in
the Seventh Amendment.
The right to jury trial is a vitally important feature of the American
legal system. As the Supreme Court stated in Dimick v. Schiedt,165 any
"curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost
care." 16 6 For this reason, META must be carefully scrutinized by every
state in order to protect one of the most vital values of the American legal
system.
Michael S. Franczak
165 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
166 Id. at 486.
467

